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Abstract
This paper investigates the influences of intrafirm geographic and cultural dispersion, the
distance between the location of a firm’s investments and its headquarters, on the firm’s
information environment. Specifically, using a sample of publicly traded real estate companies
across the Asia-Pacific region, we examine how intrafirm geographic and cultural distance
impacts a firm’s capital acquisition costs. As a consequence of both the heavily regulated
operating environment faced by these firms, as well as the capital intensive nature of this

industry, funding costs should be of pronounced importance to firms within this sector.
Consistent with this paradigm, we find that firms with geographically disperse investments
exhibit enhanced informational opacity. Specifically, firms with more geographically disperse
investments exhibit higher capital acquisition costs than their more geographically
concentrated counterparts. Similarly, firms with more culturally disparate investments also
exhibit enhanced informational opacity, as evidenced by increased capital costs. Additionally,
we present evidence that the impact of both physical and cultural distance is increasing
following the global financial crisis. Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that
both intrafirm geographic and cultural dispersion materially impact both an organization’s
information environment and funding costs.
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Introduction
Finance has long recognized the importance of information acquisition and processing to the
efficient pricing of securities, with market participants tending to reward informationally
transparent firms with a lower cost of capital than their more opaque counterparts. The opacity
of firms is generally viewed as being jointly determined by the firm’s operations, investment
activities, and disclosures. Firms adopting more transparent corporate structures, those
investing in more easily identifiable and/or stable assets, and those providing enhanced
disclosures are generally viewed as more informationally transparent.1 Interestingly, and of
central import to the current investigation, recent studies suggest that a firm’s informational
transparency may also be related to the “distance” between the firm and its investors. As
outlined in more detail below, this emerging literature finds investor holdings in “local”
companies tend to outperform holdings in companies that are more geographically distant. In
general, these gains are attributed to “local” investors’ abilities to more efficiently overcome
information barriers, either through enhanced access to soft information or through reduced
monitoring costs.
Additionally, the literature has also begun to recognize the impact culture exerts on market
development and firm operations. Of note, Hofstede (1980) defines culture as “the collective
mental programming of the human mind which distinguishes one group of people from
another.”2 More specifically, culture exerts an impact on business beyond the legal and
regulatory systems by defining perceptions and acceptable actions. Thus, culture serves to
establish the “rules of the game” that market participants must follow. Moreover, evidence of
the impact of cultural distance, the differences between the cultures of two areas, on the
performance of cross-border operations is accumulating.3
While the existing literature focuses on the physical and cultural distance between market
participants (i.e., a firm’s proximity to either its investors or other firms), we focus on the
geographic dispersion and cultural distance within a firm. More specifically, we examine how
intrafirm physical proximity and cultural similarity (i.e., the distance between a firm’s
headquarters and its investments) influences the firm’s informational opacity. Previewing our

results, we find evidence that as the physical and cultural distance within a firm increases the
organization becomes more informationally opaque. In particular, firms characterized by larger
geographic footprints and/or more cultural heterogeneity within the organization exhibit higher
implied costs of capital than firms with smaller physical footprints and/or less cultural diversity.
Moreover, we find the relations between both physical and cultural distance with the firm’s cost
of capital are magnified following the 2007 global financial crisis. Thus, we conclude these
constructs represent value relevant components of a firm’s information environment which
must be proactively and strategically managed to ensure the welfare maximization of
shareholders.
The remainder of this investigation is organized in the following manner. Section two reviews
the existing literature on the importance of geography in financial markets, motivates the use of
publicly traded Asia-Pacific real estate firms as a uniquely compelling natural laboratory in
which to examine the relations between intrafirm physical and cultural distance and information
opacity, and outlines the rationale for employing a firm’s cost of capital to examine these
issues. Section three outlines the data and empirical methods employed throughout this
investigation to examine our focal hypotheses, while section four provides the results of this
analysis. Finally, section five summarizes our key findings, highlights their implications, and
concludes.

Literature Review
Geographic Proximity
Economists have long recognized the potential benefits offered by international diversification,
as well as the potential costs associated with home bias issues.4 Only recently, however, has
the literature begun to recognize the potential advantages associated with geographic
proximity. The origins of this emerging location literature can be traced to Coval and Moskowitz
(1999, 2001), who document significantly positive, risk-adjusted returns accruing to investors’
“local” company investments.5 Such out-performance suggests investors possess a distinct,
competitive advantage in valuing “local” firms. One potential explanation for the local investor
advantage derives from the nature of the information generation, collection, and transmission
process. Specifically, a number of papers offer evidence consistent with the notion that market
participants who are physically closer to a firm are uniquely positioned to access and capture
valuable soft information regarding these “local” entities. For example, both Malloy (2005); Bae
et al. (2008) find local analysts systematically provide better recommendations and more
accurate forecasts than their more geographically distant counterparts. Similarly, Berry and
Gamble (2013) argue local retail investors possess informational advantages, as they find
security returns following earnings announcements are predicted by the trading patterns of
local market investors, while Ghoul et al. (2013) explicitly use geographic distance as a proxy
for information asymmetry.6 Within a real estate context, Ling et al. (2016) examine the role of
geography in explaining performance differentials across public and private real estate markets
within the United States, while Adams et al. (2015) provide evidence on the potential
importance of geographic proximity to a firm’s risk management activities. Importantly, this
latter paper demonstrates geographic proximity is fundamentally related to potential risk spillover effects, and further suggests such effects are magnified during periods of economic

stress and uncertainty. Taken together, the above results strongly suggest geographic
proximity plays an important role in the informational transparency of publicly traded (real
estate) companies.7
The importance of geographic proximity between market participants is becoming increasingly
apparent to both academic researchers and industry practitioners. We note that, within
international real estate markets, the vast majority of real estate firms acquiring investment
properties outside of their home country (i.e., where the firm is headquartered), retain local
expertise in the form of independent, third-party advisors, appraisers, and/or investment
managers to facilitate the acquisition, development, continuing operation, and/or divestiture of
individual properties. Moreover, an Asia Pacific Real Estate Association (APREA) (2014)
survey of nearly 200 institutional real estate investors and fund managers finds that while less
than half believe it is important for a real estate firm’s management to be located in the country
where its shares are traded, over 84% reported firm management should be located in its area
of operations. Based upon this survey evidence, institutional real estate market participants
appear to clearly believe a local market presence is important to efficient portfolio allocation
and management decision-making.

Cultural Distance
The role of culture is also receiving increased attention within the finance literature. For
example, Guiso et al. (2006, 2009) find evidence that culture influences a nation’s economic
performance, as well as economic exchanges between countries. Similarly, Aggarwal and
Goodell (2009a, b, 2010) find evidence that culture influences how a nation’s financial system
develops, while Zheng et al. (2012) find evidence that national culture helps to explain crosscountry variation in corporate debt maturity structure. Finally, from an investments perspective,
Chui et al. (2010) find that national culture influences the performance of momentum
strategies. These findings are not entirely unexpected given that culture manifests itself in how
people interact and make decisions, which in turn likely influences how firms operate along a
variety of key dimensions.8 For example, does the society readily embrace entrepreneurial risk
taking or does it tend towards risk aversion? Does a short-term or long-term investment
horizon drive decision making? How equally is power distributed across members of the group,
and does the group accept and tolerate inequality or proactively work to limit, or eliminate,
disparities across its members? Is gender equality prioritized, or does a masculine (feminine)
world view predominate? Are personal and corporate goals, initiatives, and investment
priorities driven by a pursuit of individualistic goals, or collectivistic aspirations?
In addition to presenting evidence regarding the impact of culture, the literature also presents
evidence that investors are more confident evaluating firms, assets, or investment projects in
countries that are culturally similar to the investors’ own home country.9 For example, Hofstede
(1980); Jemison and Sitkin (1986); Morosini et al. (1998) all provide evidence that cultural
distance, a measure of how dissimilar two cultures are, influences the performance of crossborder acquisitions. Furthermore, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) find that cultural distance
between markets influences the amount of foreign investment, while Anderson et al. (2011)
similarly report institutionally managed funds invest less in culturally distant countries.
Moreover, Beracha et al. (2014) find that institutional investors trade less frequently in

culturally distant countries, while Nahata et al. (2014) demonstrate that when the cultural
distance between venture capitalist and portfolio firms is greater the likelihood of success
increases. Continuing, Anita et al. (2007) observe that when the cultural distance between a
multinational firm’s headquarters and its foreign subsidiaries increases firm valuation
decreases. Along these same dimensions, Steigner and Sutton (2011) examine the
performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and find that when bidding firms have
high levels of intangible assets, their long run performance is positively associated with the
cultural distance between their home country and that of the target. Lastly, Cai and Zhu (2015)
examine the underpricing of initial public offerings issued by foreign firms within the United
States and find that the degree of underpricing is a function of the cultural distance between
the US and the firm’s country of origin. More explicitly, they find that the greater the cultural
distance, the greater the degree of underpricing. Taken together, these results suggest cultural
distance directly influences both information asymmetry and financial opacity.
While the extant literature presents evidence regarding the impact of the physical and cultural
distance between market participants, we explore the impact of physical and cultural distance
within the firm. Specifically, we explore how the physical and cultural distance between a firm’s
headquarters and the location of its cash flow generating assets influences its financial market
transparency. Ex-ante, we expect that as intrafirm physical and cultural distance increases the
firm will become more informationally opaque. In other words, we expect company outsiders
(e.g., investors, analysts, regulators, etc.) will find the firm harder to value/understand when it
is spread over a larger physical area, or has properties located in countries which are more
culturally dissimilar. Further, the resulting valuation difficulty should manifest itself in the form
of tangible, value relevant economic consequences. As such, the current investigation
explores the impact of both geographic and cultural distance on financial market opacity by
examining each firm’s implied cost-of-capital.10

Why Asia-Pacific Real Estate Firms?
To effectively identify and isolate the relations between intrafirm geographic and cultural
distance and a firm’s opacity, it is critically important to control for as many potential sources of
extraneous variation as possible. As informational transparency is likely to differ markedly
across industries and market sectors, to assist in this process we restrict our analysis to a
single industry. Additionally, an ideal sample would focus on a subset of firms for which
informational transparency issues may be uniquely important. Therefore, we focus exclusively
on publicly traded real estate companies (e.g., REITs, listed property trusts, and developers)
across the Asia-Pacific region. Focusing on this specific industry provides a number of
compelling advantages. First, unlike industries with high levels of investment in intangible
assets, research and development expenditures, and/or intellectual property rights, real estate
firms generally hold portfolios of easily identifiable, tangible assets.11 Furthermore, as space
markets continue to be highly localized, the cashflows accruing to these assets are largely a
function of the economic conditions prevailing in the local market area in which each individual
asset is physically located.12 Both of these factors help us more effectively identify the true
geographic and cultural exposure faced by each sample firm.

Second, the unique regulatory environment in which these firms operate further motivates the
use of this industry as a laboratory for the current investigation. Real estate firms around the
world are typically viewed as being capital constrained. Firms choosing to pursue REIT status
typically face high regulatory mandated payout ratios which effectively prohibit them from
retaining large enough sums of capital to endogenously fund capital expansion activities. Even
for those firms not facing mandatory payout requirements, the large scale of many commercial
real estate investment activities necessitates active and continuing engagement with broader
financial markets. As documented by Amihud and Mendelsohn (1986, 2000), financial market
transparency has been shown to influence a firm’s cost of capital, and thus, real estate firms
with a frequent need to access external capital markets are likely to place a high value on both
financial market transparency and the resultant reduction in their cost of capital.
Third, while each of the aforementioned advantages suggests commercial real estate markets
are a good laboratory for our examination, Asia-Pacific real estate markets offer one final
advantage over their U.S. and European counterparts – high levels of cross-border investment.
While U.S. based real estate companies typically hold relatively few, if any, properties outside
of the United States, Asia-Pacific real estate firms exhibit a significant proclivity toward
investing across international borders. To illustrate this point, we note that firms within our
sample disclosed investment property holdings across 47 different countries. A more complete
description of our sample is provided in the Data and Methodology section, while a
comprehensive listing of the geographic locations for all 9876 investment properties held by
sample firms is provided in Appendix 1.

Cost of Capital Considerations
The extant literature demonstrates that both corporate and managerial policies, practices, and
procedures which increase a firm’s informational opacity also effectively serve to increase its
cost of capital. For example, Anglin et al. (2011) suggest that as information asymmetries
between investors and managers increase, so too does the firm’s cost of capital. Similarly,
Danielsen et al. (2009, 2014) demonstrate that enhanced accounting disclosures reduce
information barriers between firms and investors, engender positive certification effects
regarding the company’s continuing operations, and thereby lead to reductions in the
organization’s capital acquisition costs. Perhaps most closely related to the current
investigation, Cashman et al. (2015) examine REITs and listed property trusts across the AsiaPacific region and find evidence that increased exposure to political risk increases both a firm’s
cost of raising external equity and its weighted average cost of capital. While these studies
provide support for the conceptual framework we utilize, namely, that increasing informational
opacity increases a firm’s cost of capital, to the best of our knowledge the existing literature
has not yet explored the impact of either intrafirm geographic or cultural distance on firm
opacity.

Data and Methodology
Data
In assembling our sample, we begin by identifying all Asia-Pacific real estate companies (e.g.,
REITs, listed property trusts, real estate operating companies, and development firms)

followed by SNL Financial that trade on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bombay Stock
Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock Exchange at
any point from January 2000 to December 2013.13 We then match each SNL firm to
Bloomberg, which provides daily stock prices. We use firm ticker symbol, institution name, and
stock exchange to match observations between the two databases. Firms for which we are
unable to obtain matching Bloomberg data are removed from the sample. This results in a
sample of 160 real estate firms, headquartered in six distinct countries, investing in 9876
properties, which are spread across 47 countries. Table 1 provides a breakdown of both the
countries where sample firms are headquartered and where their investment properties are
physically located, while Appendix 2 provides a comprehensive listing of all sample firms by
the country in which they are headquartered. We note that while nearly 60% of our sample real
estate firms are headquartered in Hong Kong or Singapore, less than 20% of the properties in
our sample are located within these same two jurisdictions. Additionally, we note that a robust
17.6% of the investment properties held by sample firms are located in countries outside of the
six nations in which our sample firms are headquartered. These two facts clearly reflect the
willingness and ability of many Asia-Pacific real estate firms to engage in cross-border
investment activities. On the other hand, somewhat less obvious from these raw numbers is
the inter-country variation in foreign investment proclivity. While considerably more than half of
all sample firms headquartered in Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore invest internationally,
only 7 of the 42 sample firms headquartered in China, India, and Japan engage in international
investments. This country level variation motivates our use of country level fixed effects
throughout the empirical analysis which follows.
Table 1 Geographic distribution of sample companies and properties
Headquarter # of real
country
estate
firms
Australia
China
Hong Kong
India
Japan
Singapore
Other
Total

23
7
48
8
27
47
0
160

% of
total
firms
14.38%
4.38%
30.00%
5.00%
16.88%
29.38%
0.00%
100%

# of
% of total
properties properties

1941
1503
1161
162
2573
799
1737
9876

19.65%
15.22%
11.76%
1.64%
26.05%
8.09%
17.59%
100%

Foreign
properties /
Total
properties
19.50%
0%
43.91%
0%
1.37%
52.05%

% with
foreign
properties
62.03%
0%
77.75%
0%
25.31%
84.41%

This table provides a breakdown of the headquarter locations of the real estate firms in our sample, as
well as the geographic location distribution of all properties owned by sample firms

Estimating the Cost of Capital
In examining the market’s reaction to a firm’s decisions regarding the physical footprint and
cultural diversity of its investment property portfolio, we employ each firm’s cost of debt, cost of
equity, and weighted average cost of capital as our key dependent variables of interest. Each
firm’s cost of debt is estimated simply as its annual total interest expenses divided by its total
debt.14 Turning to equity acquisition costs, we follow the prior literature and estimate each
firm’s cost of equity via a residual income valuation model.15 Conceptually, the value of a firm
at any point in time should be approximately equal to its current book value plus the present
value of any future abnormal earnings. Thus, algebraically:
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,0 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,0 + �

where:

∞

𝑡𝑡=1

𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
(1+𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒 )𝑡𝑡

(1)

P 0current stock price for firm i
B i,0current book value of equity for firm i
B i,t book value of equity for firm i at time t
r i,e required rate of return on equity for firm i
E i,t net income during period t for firm i.
In operationalizing this model, Lee et al. (1999) find that the quality of their estimation of
current firm values is insensitive to the choice of the forecast horizon beyond 3 years. Thus, in
order to have a closed-form expression, we employ a three year forward looking window for
future earnings to estimate each firm’s cost of equity. Furthermore, following the previous real
estate literature, to mitigate problems associated with lack of analyst forecast estimates
regarding future earnings, we assume perfect foresight and recursively solve Eq. (1) for the
firm’s required rate of return on equity. Market data required to estimate this relation are
obtained directly from Bloomberg, while the accounting data necessary to estimate component
weights from a book value perspective are obtained from SNL Financial. Finally, to estimate
each firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), we sum the estimated costs of each
capital component multiplied by their proportional weights, which are defined based upon each
firm’s market leverage ratio. Hence, algebraically:

where:

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡 (𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑡𝑡 )(1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 (𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 ) (2)

W Di,t

weight of debt in the capital structure of firm i at time t

r Di,t

cost of debt for firm i at time t

T i,t

marginal tax rate of firm i at time t (equal to zero for most REITs)

W ei,t

weight of equity in the capital structure of firm i at time t

r ei,t

cost of equity for firm i at time t.

Distance Metrics
Physical Geography
In order to calculate physical distance, we start by obtaining the geographic locations (i.e.,
addresses) of each firm’s headquarters, as well as every property in which the firm held an
investment stake at any point in time over our sample period. We then map (i.e., geocode)
these locations to obtain precise latitude and longitude coordinates for each observation. Next,
using these coordinates we estimate the Haversine (great circle) distance between each firm’s
headquarters location and each of its associated investment property holdings. Finally, we
calculate the average geographic distance between the firm’s headquarters and its investment
properties.16 Specifically, we use the following equation:
1

𝑚𝑚

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚 �𝑝𝑝 {3963.1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 −1 [sin(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝 ) × sin(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) + cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝 ) ×
where:

cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) × cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) (3)

m

the total number of investment property interests held by firm i at month t

lat_P i,t,p

the latitude of property p’s location for firm i at month t

lat_H i,t

the latitude of the headquarters location of firm i at month t

long_P i,t,p

the longitude of property p’s location for firm i at month t

long_H i,t

the longitude of the headquarters location of firm i at month t.

To the extent increasing the physical scope of a firm’s operations hinders the information
generation, collection, processing, or dissemination capability of market participants, we would
expect firms characterized by a wider geographic scope of operations (e.g., a larger average
distance between their headquarters and investment property locations) to be more
informationally opaque. As such, we anticipate our average distance metric to be positively
related to a firm’s implied cost of capital.
Cultural Distance Proxies
We again note that the premise of our investigation is to evaluate the impact of intrafirm
distance on the information environment surrounding the firm. Accordingly, we anticipate that
as the cultural distance within a firm increases the firm will become more informationally
opaque. While measuring physical distance is relatively straightforward, measuring culture
distance is somewhat more difficult. To quantify the social characteristics that comprise

culture, we turn to the field of social psychology. Early work by Hofstede (1980, 2001); Franke
et al. (1991), as well as more recent investigations by House et al. (2004); Minkov (2007);
Anderson et al. (2011), provide the benchmark indices we employ to investigate the impact of
culture on a firm’s information environment. Specifically, we rely on two widely used metrics –
Hofstede Scores and GLOBE Indices -- to measure culture and calculate intrafirm cultural
distance.
Hofstede scores are obtained from Geert Hofstede’s website (www.geert-hofstede.com/) and
are designed to measure six distinct cultural dimensions. These factors include assessments
of a society’s attitudes and responses with respect to issues of: 1) Power Distance, 2)
Individualism versus Collectivism, 3) Masculinity versus Femininity, 4) Uncertainty Avoidance,
5) Long Term versus Short Term Orientation, and 6) Indulgence versus Restraint. More
detailed descriptions of each of these dimensions (as well as all sample variables) may be
found in Appendix 3. Operationally, these six factors are combined to create two separate
culture indices. First, following Kogut and Singh (1988) we exclude information regarding both
a country’s Long Term Orientation and proclivity towards Indulgence and construct an average
index of cultural distance using the original four dimensions of cultural identity (Hofstede 4
Factor Index) proposed by Hofstede. Second, following the work of Franke et al. (1991);
Minkov (2007), which together provide the conceptual foundations for extending Hofstede’s
original four dimensions to its current six, we also construct an average index of cultural
distance using all six Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede 6 Factor Index). For those countries in
which Hofstede individual dimension scores are unavailable, we replace missing values with
the average value across all nations for that specific year and month.17
To ensure our empirical results are not driven by idiosyncratic factors specific to the
construction of these Hofstede metrics, for robustness we also employ two cultural distance
metrics derived from Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE)
Indices. These GLOBE scores were first introduced by House et al. (2004), and encompass
the following nine dimensions of culture: 1) Performance Orientation, 2) Uncertainty
Avoidance, 3) In-Group Collectivism, 4) Power Distance, 5) Gender Egalitarianism, 6) Humane
Orientation, 7) Institutional Collectivism, 8) Future Orientation, and 9) Assertiveness. As with
our Hofstede metrics, one of our GLOBE indices (Globe 9 Factor Index) employs the entire set
of available factors, while our second index employs a more parsimonious subset. Specifically,
following Anderson et al. (2011), we create a more restricted GLOBE index (Globe 4 Factor
Index) which includes only the following four cultural dimensions: Future Orientation,
Assertiveness, In-Group Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance. As with our Hofstede
Indices, for countries in which GLOBE dimension scores are unavailable, we replace the
missing values with the average value across all nations for that specific year and month.18
Our cultural distance metric is a weighted average of the cultural distance between the firm
headquarters nation’s cultural values and the cultural index values of those nations in which its
investment properties are located. Specifically, for each firm-month we calculate the
percentage (based on the number of properties) of each firm’s investment property portfolio
holdings that are located within each country.19 We then multiply these country specific
portfolio location weights by individual country cultural distance measures which are found by
taking the absolute value of the difference between the index values for the country where a

firm’s properties are located and the index value for the country where the firm’s headquarters
is located. This procedure is repeated for each of the cultural indices examined.
Mathematically:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃

where:

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑 = � (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐,𝑑𝑑 ) (4)

NIP i,t,c

the total number of investment property interests located in country c, held by firm i, at

𝑐𝑐

𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

month t,

TNIP i,t

the total number of investment property interests held by firm i, at month t,

CD i,t,c,d
the level of cultural distance between firm i’s headquarter country and properties located
in country c, at month t, along cultural difference dimension d.
Control Variables
Following Cashman et al. (2016), to provide a complete and robust econometric specification
we also control for both the general business environment and firm specific characteristics. A
comprehensive list of these controls, along with a detailed description of their construction
and/or measurement, is provided in Appendix 3.20 In addition, we also control for each firm’s
exposure to political risk. Cashman et al. (2014, 2016, 2015) all present evidence that the
political risk associated with the location of a firm’s investments impacts its operations,
organizational structure, and ability to raise capital. To account for this possibility, we utilize
four measures previously employed in the existing literature to control for political risk.21
Specifically, the four metrics we employ are: 1) a Disclosure Index, reported by the World
Bank, designed to measure the quality and quantity of corporate disclosures with respect to
ownership and financial information; 2) an Operations Risk Index (ORI), reported by Business
Risk Services, designed to measure the business friendly nature of the overall political and
regulatory environment; 3) a Remittance and Repatriation of Capital (R-Factor) Index, also
reported by Business Risk Services, designed to measure the relative ease of capital flows
across jurisdictional boundaries; and 4) a Political Risk Index (PRI), reported by Business Risk
Service, designed to measure the sociopolitical conditions of a country. To facilitate readability
and ease interpretation, each of these indices have been (re)scaled such that positive values
indicate increased risk exposure along that particular dimension. Consistent with the existing
literature, we use the geographic (country) location of every individual real estate property held
by each firm in the sample to estimate (investment property location weighted average)
measures of each firm’s exposure to political risk. Specifically, for each of our four political risk
proxies we create firm specific political risk index values as follows:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃

where:

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝑐𝑐 ) (5)

NIP i,t,c

the total number of investment property interests located in country c, held by firm i, at

month t,

𝑐𝑐

𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

TNIP i , t

the total number of investment property interests held by firm i, at month t, and.

Country Level refers to one of the four political risk indices outlined above:
Risk Metric t,c Disclosure, Operations Risk, R-Factor, and Political Risk.
Furthermore, we control for a firm’s foreign investment experience. Specifically, we control for
the firm’s entrance into a “new country” (i.e. its acquisition of a property in a country where the
firm did not previously have an equity investment), the amount of time the firm has been
engaged in cross border investing, an indicator variable identifying those firms whose
headquarters location and exchange trading venue are in different countries, the percentage of
the firm’s investment properties that are located in foreign countries, and an indicator variable
identifying those firms who employ foreign denominated debt within their capital structure.
Conceptually, the acquisition of a property in a “new” country may make the firm more
informationally opaque. For example, it may well take a non-trivial investment of managerial
time and/or other company resources to fully integrate these new and diverse investments into
the company’s operational framework and risk management apparatus. Similarly, the market
has to learn about the firm’s ability to operate within this new environment, including their
ability to coordinate activities across a broader geographic footprint and manage the risks
inherent in operating across additional political jurisdictions. Jointly, these effects may well
increase uncertainty surrounding the vitality of the firm’s operations, and thus be associated
with increased capital costs.
Conversely, it is possible that as firms spend more time investing internationally, the market
becomes more familiar with both the firm’s international activities and their ability to manage
and mitigate potential risk exposure along this dimension. Therefore, as the duration of a firm’s
international investment experience increases, we would expect both uncertainty surrounding
the firm’s operations and the resulting cost of capital to decline. The decision to list in a country
other than the nation in which the firm is headquartered adds an additional layer of complexity
that the market must contend with. As such, ex-ante we anticipate such firms will be more
informationally opaque, and therefore characterized by higher capital acquisition costs.22
Moreover, as with the duration of a firm’s international experience, the portion of the firm’s
investments located in foreign countries may proxy for international expertise which may
mitigating risk exposure. Lastly, while the use of foreign denominated debt by a firm adds an
additional layer of complexity to their operations, risk management function, and resulting
valuations, these potential costs may well be offset by lower capital costs associated with
accessing a broader potential investor base, more complete disclosures necessary to satisfy
multiple regulatory authorities, risk reduction through matching the currency of expected
revenues and liabilities, and/or positive signaling effects regarding the firm’s market power and
position.
Methodology
Our empirical investigation proceeds in two stages. We first provide descriptive statistics and
univariate comparisons designed to allow the reader to gain insight into the nature of both the
firms in our sample and the Asia-Pacific real estate markets in which they operate, as well as
their comparability to alternative real estate firms and markets around the world. We next

proceed to the multivariate portion of our analysis where we examine the influence of intrafirm
physical and cultural distance on a firm’s information environment, simultaneously controlling
for a broad array of firm and market characteristics. As outlined above, if the physical scope of
the firm’s property holdings and/or the cultural distance between its assets influences the firm’s
information environment, the effects should manifest themselves in the form of higher cost of
capital estimates.
Throughout the multi-variate portion of our analysis, our cost of capital regressions employ the
following general form23:

(6)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2−5 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+𝛽𝛽6−9 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+𝛽𝛽10−18 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+𝛽𝛽19−37 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽38−42 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

A significant, positive coefficient on 𝛽𝛽 1 in Eq. 6 would be consistent with a firm’s intrafirm
physical distance creating information barriers, lowering the financial market transparency of
the firm, and thereby raising the firm’s cost of capital. Similarly, a significant positive coefficient
on 𝛽𝛽 2 in Eq. 6 would be consistent with intrafirm cultural distance contributing to increased
informational opacity, valuation difficulties for sample firms, and, as a consequence, increased
capital costs.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each variable employed throughout our analysis. The
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for sample firms averaged 8.7% across our sample
period, with the component costs of debt and equity estimated at 2.9% and 13.6%,
respectively.24 Each estimate appears to be economically reasonable, and very much in line
with ex-ante expectations.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
N
Cost of capital metrics
Weighted average cost of capital
Cost of debt (rd)
Cost of equity (re)
Distance metrics
Geographic distance
Physical distance (in
1000 miles)

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Min

Max

14,497 0.087
14,497 0.029
14,497 0.136

0.076
0.022
0.108

0.055
0.025
0.096

0.013 0.330
0.000 0.172
0.023 0.422

14,497 0.985

0.439

1.363

0.000 6.781

N
Cultural distance indices
Hofstede 4 factor index
Hofstede 6 factor index
GLOBE 4 Factor Index
GLOBE 9 Factor Index
Control variables
Political risk metrics
Disclosure
ORI
R-Factor
PRI
Business environment measures
UK Law
Bank dominated
GAAP
Time to export
Property acquisition
complexity
Market cap / GDP
Broadband per 100
Education Spending
Female labor force
participation
General firm characteristics
Market cap ($Millions)
MtoB
Leverage
Asset tangibility
Total assets (in $1000s)
Profitability
Secured debt
Rate debt
Split rating
Asset age
Repurchases
Operating leverage
Lease payments

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Min

Max

14,497 0.373
14,497 0.356
14,497 1.036
14,497 1.100

0.074
0.094
0.300
0.346

0.794
0.644
1.449
1.471

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

5.288
3.590
5.932
7.331

14,497 0.815
14,497 0.618
14,497 0.700
14,497 0.557

0.808
0.634
0.728
0.560

0.107
0.069
0.161
0.116

0.500
0.380
0.385
0.350

1.000
0.757
0.970
0.760

14,497 0.727
14,497 0.186
14,497 0.303
14,497 11.936
14,497 25.169

0.917
0.000
0.000
10.901
28.000

0.345
0.389
0.460
4.854
14.519

0.000
0.000
0.000
6.000
4.033

1.000
1.000
1.000
27.000
94.985

14,497 171.032
14,497 18.697
14,497 14.024
14,497 54.549

121.335
21.747
13.471
55.617

132.969
9.211
5.390
7.520

19.356 606.004
0.021 37.516
6.051 25.014
26.900 69.000

14,497 3469.680 1162.460 5765.060 6.998 52,644.310
14,497 1.158
0.940
0.995
0.120 8.552
14,497 0.689
0.539
0.619
0.000 4.235
14,497 0.537
0.542
0.054
0.079 0.753
14,497 5,527,630 2,009,384 8,776,906 206
66,174,868
14,497 0.057
0.055
0.065
−0.675 0.488
14,497 49.308
46.419
41.404
0.000 100.000
14,497 0.418
0.000
0.493
0.000 1.000
14,497 0.050
0.000
0.218
0.000 1.000
14,497 5.960
6.000
3.253
1.000 13.000
14,497 0.028
0.000
0.165
0.000 1.000
14,497 1.713
1.217
3.096
−4.078 10.739
14,497 0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000 0.034

# of countries
Development
REIT Status
# of Properties
Single country
Home indicator
Foreign experience
Entrance
Foreign tenure
Headquarter ≠ Exchange
Foreign properties/Total
properties
Foreign debt indicator

N
Mean
14,497 3.010
14,497 0.584
14,497 0.365
14,497 50.152
14,497 0.445
14,497 0.318

Median
2.000
1.000
0.000
31.000
0.000
0.000

Std Dev
3.260
0.493
0.482
51.488
0.497
0.466

Min
1.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000

Max
18.000
1.000
1.000
317.000
1.000
1.000

14,497 0.001
14,497 96.147
14,497 0.052
14,497 0.339

0.000
90.000
0.000
0.158

0.033
65.057
0.222
0.372

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.000
787.000
1.000
1.000

14,497 0.374

0.000

0.484

0.000 1.000

This table provides basic descriptive statistics (sample size, mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum, and maximum) for the variables considered in the analysis. Appendix 3 provides a detailed
description and definition of each variable

Turning to our focal distance metrics, we find our sample of publicly traded Asia-Pacific real
estate firms hold investments across a broad geographic area. The average distance between
a company’s headquarters and its investment properties is nearly 1000 miles. Epitomizing the
international nature of this industry, Federation Centres is headquartered in Australia, but has
held shopping center interests across Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The
average geographic distance between the company’s headquarters in Melbourne and its
hundreds of investment properties was literally thousands of miles over much of our sample
period.25
With respect to cultural distance, the economic intuition is more complex. Each of our metrics
are correlated (see Table 3 for specific correlations), with an underlying index based upon a
100 point scale. In calculating these distances, as outlined above, we take the squared
deviations and standardize them by the cross-national variance of the index.26 This provides a
measure of how distinct the cultures of those nations in which the firm invests are from the
national culture associated with the firm’s headquarters location. Operationally, we are
relatively unconcerned with the absolute value of these indices, but rather are primarily
concerned with the marginal impact of changes in these indices on the capital acquisition costs
of the firm. Comfortingly, the data in Table 2 suggest considerable variation exists along each
of these cultural distance metrics, thus providing a robust framework and set of benchmarks
with which to investigate our focal relations.

Table 3 Intrafirm physical and cultural distance correlation matrix
Pearson correlation coefficients
N = 14,497, Prob > |r| under H0: Rho = 0
Hofstede Hofstede
Physical
4 Factor 6 Factor
distance
index
index
Hofstede 4 0.5801
Factor
(<.0001)
Index
Hofstede 6 0.6341 0.9722
Factor
(<.0001) (<.0001)
Index
GLOBE 4 0.4357 0.6677
0.6821
Factor
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Index
GLOBE 9 0.4359 0.6423
0.6646
Factor
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Index
−0.1046 −0.0510 −0.0670
Disclosure
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
-0.0346 −0.0655 −0.0804
ORI
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
−0.3441 0.0123
−0.0003
R-Factor
(<.0001) (0.1403) (0.9725)
0.2260 0.1267
0.1101
PRI
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)

GLOBE GLOBE
4 Factor 9 Factor Disclosure
index
index

ORI

RFactor

0.9630
(<.0001)
−0.2825
(<.0001)
−0.3427
(<.0001)
−0.0423
(<.0001)
−0.0002
(0.9797)

−0.2622
(<.0001)
−0.3850
(<.0001)
−0.0586
(<.0001)
0.0122
(0.1415)

0.6356
(<.0001)
0.1926
(<.0001)
−0.0681
(<.0001)

0.2408
(<.0001)
0.2393 −0.2051
(<.0001) (<.0001)

This table reports the correlation coefficients associated with our various distance and political risk
measures. The Hofstede 4 Factor Index is the property weighted average of cultural distance based on
Hofstede’s: Power Distance Index, Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity,
and Uncertainty Avoidance Index. Hofstede 6 Factor Index is the property weighted average of cultural
distance based on all six of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. GLOBE 4 Factor Index is the property
weighted cultural distance measure based on GLOBE’s: Future Orientation, Assertiveness, In-Group
Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance metrics. GLOBE 9 Factor Index is the property weighted
average of culture distance based on all of GLOBE’s cultural dimensions. Physical Distance to
Properties is the average geographic distance between a firm’s headquarters and its investment
properties. Disclosure is the property weighted average of the Business Extent of Disclosure index. ORI
is the property weighted average of the operations risk index measure. R-Factor measures the ease
with which a firm can repatriate profits out of a given country. PRI is the property weighted average of
the Political Risk Index and measures sociopolitical risk. More detailed definitions are provided in the
Appendix 3

Examining these exposure metrics more closely reveals interesting patterns in firm investment
activity across time. For example, in Fig. 1 we note that during the early years of our analysis

fewer than 35% of sample firms restricted their investment activities to a single country, while
by the end of our sample period this number had risen to over 55%. This increased investment
focus is further evidenced, in Fig. 2, by a noticeable reduction in the average number of
investment property interests held by sample firms. More specifically, during the early years of
our sample, firms held an average of over 60 properties in their investment portfolios. Over our
sample interval, this number declined by more than 25%, dropping below 45 property holdings
per firm by 2013. On the other hand, focusing exclusively on those firms which choose to
invest abroad, we find evidence that they are increasing the size of their physical footprint and
cultural heterogeneity. For example, in Fig. 3, while the average physical distance between
firm headquarters and investment property locations increased modestly during our sample
period, the average values for all four cultural distance metrics increased markedly. More
specifically, both Hofstede metrics increased more than three-fold, while the average values
for our two GLOBE exposure indices increased between 40% and 50%. While a formal
analysis of these trends is beyond the scope of the current investigation, they are consistent
with the notion that Asia-Pacific real estate markets have witnessed an important evolution in
recent years. These changes entail both an increase in the aggregate level of international
holdings and, simultaneously, an increasing concentration of those holdings within a smaller
subset of firms who may well (or may not) be uniquely positioned to manage this exposure.

Fig. 1 Percentage of firms investing in a single country each year

Fig. 2 Average number of properties owned by a firm each year

Fig. 3 Firms investing in multiple countries by distance

Continuing, our dataset also includes a number of important control variables designed to
ensure the accuracy, consistency, and robustness of our core results. We divide these controls
into four groups: 1) Political Risk Metrics, 2) Business Environment Measures, 3) General Firm
Characteristics, and 4) Foreign Experience. As with our cultural distance metrics, the actual
cardinal values assigned to our Political Risk attributes are of relatively little import. That said,
we note that the considerable variation exhibited by each of these metrics should allow us to

more effectively control for the potential influence of these forces, and thereby provide a
cleaner and more powerful test.
Similarly, our business environment controls are generally most noteworthy in that they exhibit
discernable variation. Highlighting a pair of these variables, we observe 72.7% of firm month
observations come from firms headquartered in countries whose legal systems are based
upon the foundational tenets of (British) Common Law, while 30.3% of sample observations
are associated with accounting disclosures following Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) rather than International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).27 As firms are
disproportionately more likely to be impacted by the prevailing legal and regulatory accounting
environment of the jurisdiction in which they are headquartered, we choose to measure these
attributes at the firm (rather than portfolio) level. Once again, these numbers are also
consistent with previously reported findings within the literature along these dimensions.
Turning to our firm specific metrics, the average firm in our sample is characterized by a
market value of equity of almost US$3.5 billion. This number is slightly larger than that found
for U.S. based firms, but is heavily skewed by a handful of very large observations. For
example, Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited, a Hong Kong based (diversified) development firm,
was valued at over US$52.6 billion in January of 2008. The median value along this dimension
of approximately US$1.2 billion is nearly identical to that found in U.S. markets. Similarly, the
market-to-book ratio for sample firms averages 1.158, while the average debt ratio is 40.8%
(Debt/Equity = 0.689). These numbers are again very much in line with those reported by
publicly traded real estate companies within the United States.28 Interestingly, the sample is
relatively evenly split between firms with active development programs (58.4%) and those
restricting their activities to the ownership and/or operation of existing structures.
With respect to investment property holdings, the typical firm in our sample holds 50 distinct
investment properties, though we once again observe wide variation along this dimension and,
as previously mentioned, sample firms appear to be increasing their focus and investing in
fewer properties through time. Additionally, we note that while the typical firm holds investment
properties in 3 countries, approximately 20% of our sample firm-month observations come
from firms holding investment assets across five or more countries, again highlighting the
willingness of firms within this region to invest across international boundaries. Conversely, we
observe that 45% of our sample observations represent firms limiting their investments to a
single country, and 32% of the sample represents firms restricting their investments to their
home country. That said, as noted above, these investment holdings appear to exhibit an
increasing focus/concentration over time.
Finally, our last set of controls are designed to capture the foreign experience of sample firms
with respect to managing and mitigating risk. Along this dimension, we observe that the typical
firm in our sample has held international investments for approximately eight years
(96 months). Additionally, we find a non-trivial 5.2% of sample observations are from firms
headquartered in countries other than where their equity shares are traded. While only 0.1% of
sample observations involve firms entering a new market within any given month, this pattern
represents 8% of firms in our sample when extended across the entire evaluation
period/interval. Moreover, we note the typical firm has approximately 34% of their investment

portfolio holdings in foreign countries, while 37% have accessed foreign markets to raise debt.
In general, the values presented in Table 2 are broadly consistent with those reported by
Cashman et al. (2016) and other studies of the modern Asia-Pacific real estate marketplace.
Univariate Comparisons
Table 4 presents the results of our univariate analysis. Each month, we split firms into high and
low intrafirm distance groups based upon the median intrafirm geographic and cultural
distance values. We then compare the mean weighted average cost of capital across these
sub-samples. Consistent with expectations, we find the weighted average cost of capital is
higher at firms with more culturally divergent portfolios. On the other hand, somewhat
surprisingly we also find that firms with investments spread over a larger geographic area
exhibit lower weighted average capital costs.29 While partially consistent with expectations,
these univariate comparisons may well mask the true underlying nature of the relation between
distance and transparency. In particular, multi-national firms may well be more informationally
transparent in spite of, rather than because of, the scope and breadth of their operations. For
example, the multinational companies within our sample are significantly larger than those
firms constraining their investment holdings to a single country.30 Failure to control for
confounding organizational characteristics, like firm size, may well lead to misleading
conclusions. As such, we simply note these findings and proceed to the multivariate portion of
our analysis.
Table 4 Univariate comparisons of cost of capital acquisition

Variable
Geographic distance:
Physical distance
Cultural distance:
Hofstede 4 Factor index
Hofstede 6 Factor index
GLOBE 4 Factor index
GLOBE 9 Factor index

High distance
Obs.
Mean

Low distance
Obs.
Mean

T-test of difference

7288

0.0834

7209

0.0913

−0.0080***

7292
7289
7288
7288

0.0883
0.0883
0.092
0.0914

7205
7208
7209
7209

0.0863
0.0864
0.0826
0.0832

0.0020**
0.0019**
0.0094***
0.0082***

This table presents univariate tests of differences in means for the Implied Cost of Capital of firms with
headquarters locations that are geographically and/or culturally proximate versus distant from their
investment property holdings. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively

Multivariate Determinants of Capital Acquisition Costs
Table 5 presents the results of our multivariate analysis into the relation between a firm’s
intrafirm physical and cultural distance and its weighted average cost of capital. All
specifications include the controls previously mentioned, as well as time, property type, firm,
and exchange fixed effects.31 Additionally, each model includes the average (physical)
distance between the firm’s headquarters and the properties held within its investment
portfolio. Columns one through four sequentially iterate through each of our four intrafirm

cultural distance indices: 1) Hofstede Four Factor, 2) Hofstede Six Factor, 3) GLOBE Four
Factor, and 4) GLOBE Nine Factor. Positive coefficient estimates on either the physical or
cultural distance indices across each of these models would be consistent with intrafirm
distance increasing the informational opacity of the firm.
Table 5 The effects of distance on the cost of capital acquisition
Variables
Geographic distance
Physical distance

(I)

(II)

0.007*** 0.006**
(2.90)
(2.46)

(III)
0.005*
(1.95)

(IV)
0.010***
(4.14)

Cultural distance indices
Hofstede 4 Factor index

0.019***
(4.53)
0.028***
(4.62)

Hofstede 6 Factor index

0.036***
(9.12)

GLOBE 4 Factor index

0.030***
(5.89)

GLOBE 9 Factor index
Political risk metrics
Disclosure
ORI
R-Factor
PRI

−0.074
(−1.09)
-0.118***
(−3.08)
0.148***
(3.95)
0.268***
(7.64)

−0.033 0.163** 0.066
(−0.47) (2.09)
(0.82)
−0.112*** −0.113*** −0.095**
(−2.91) (−2.95) (−2.47)
0.145*** 0.149*** 0.128***
(3.89)
(4.00)
(3.40)
0.256*** 0.284*** 0.308***
(7.22)
(8.28)
(9.06)

Business environment measures
UK Law
Bank dominated
GAAP
Time to export
Property acquisition complexity

0.236*** 0.216*** 0.212*** 0.202***
(7.51)
(6.74)
(6.56)
(6.17)
−0.226*** −0.228*** 0.060*** −0.350***
(−11.27) (−11.33) (3.53)
(−15.06)
-0.003** −0.003* −0.003* −0.003*
(−1.97) (−1.94) (−1.86) (−1.84)
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(10.28) (10.28) (10.37) (9.82)
−0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***

Variables

Market cap/GDP
Broadband per 100
Education spending
Female labor force participation

(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(−6.86) (−6.82) (−5.77) (−6.39)
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(10.33) (10.42) (10.49) (10.70)
−0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−8.84) (−8.88) (−9.74) (−8.88)
−0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004***
(−10.12) (−10.18) (−9.90) (−9.29)
−0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−5.63) (−5.71) (−5.83) (−5.32)

General firm characteristics
Ln(Mkt Cap)
MtoB
Lagged leverage
Asset tangibility
Log(Total assets)
Profitability
Secured debt
Rated debt
Split rating
Asset age
Repurchases
Operating leverage
Lease payments
# of Countries

0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(4.65)
(4.67)
(4.39)
(4.44)
−0.006*** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.005***
(−7.40) (−7.43) (−7.85) (−7.46)
0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(4.54)
(4.55)
(4.35)
(4.57)
−0.039*** −0.039*** −0.040*** −0.040***
(−4.85) (−4.90) (−5.04) (−4.94)
−0.048*** −0.048*** −0.048*** −0.048***
(−21.11) (−21.02) (−21.48) (−21.14)
0.066*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(7.02)
(6.99)
(7.21)
(7.19)
−0.000** −0.000** −0.000** −0.000**
(−2.16) (−2.10) (−2.37) (−2.21)
−0.177*** −0.174*** 0.149*** −0.150***
(−9.63) (−9.88) (14.98) (−6.63)
0.375*** 0.374*** −0.059*** 0.085***
(13.55) (13.73) (−5.07) (8.51)
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.019***
(5.18)
(5.04)
(9.91)
(10.33)
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.43)
(0.45)
(0.40)
(0.46)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.66)
(0.67)
(0.68)
(0.66)
0.743** 0.750** 0.746** 0.733**
(2.32)
(2.35)
(2.37)
(2.29)
−0.006*** −0.006*** −0.005*** −0.006***

Variables

Development
REIT Status
# of Properties
Single country
Home indicator

(I)
(−10.57)
0.002
(1.59)
0.004
(0.54)
0.000***
(3.04)
0.006
(0.60)
−0.018*
(−1.78)

(II)
(−10.62)
0.002
(1.59)
0.002
(0.30)
0.000***
(3.33)
0.007
(0.71)
−0.019*
(−1.91)

(III)
(−9.50)
0.003**
(1.98)
0.081***
(8.50)
0.000**
(2.49)
0.010
(1.03)
−0.023**
(−2.34)

(IV)
(−10.04)
0.002
(1.60)
0.057***
(5.69)
0.000***
(2.86)
0.009
(0.96)
−0.023**
(−2.26)

Foreign experience
0.022** 0.022** 0.020** 0.021**
(2.17)
(2.15)
(2.02)
(2.04)
−0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
Foreign tenure
(−3.24) (−3.22) (−3.32) (−3.48)
0.524*** 0.522*** 0.050*** 0.448***
Headquarter ≠ Exchange
(17.18) (17.37) (3.05)
(15.82)
0.029*
0.025
−0.011 −0.035*
Foreign properties/Total properties
(1.86)
(1.56)
(−0.73) (−1.82)
−0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.015***
Foreign debt indicator
(−4.43) (−4.40) (−4.43) (−4.39)
0.773*** 0.766*** 0.297*** 0.638***
Constant
(11.81) (11.65) (4.61)
(8.12)
Year & month fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Property type fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Exchange fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
14,497 14,497 14,497 14,497
Adjusted R-squared
0.560
0.560
0.561
0.560
Entrance

This table examines the effects of distance on an Asia-Pacific real estate firm’s cost of capital. The
dependent variable is the implied weighted average cost of capital acquisition. All standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered by firm and year-month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively

Examining these results, we find strong evidence suggesting that as intrafirm physical and
cultural distance increases, firms become more informationally opaque. Specifically, the
average geographic distance between a firm’s headquarters and its investment properties is
positive and significant related to a firm’s WACC across all four model specifications,

suggesting firms which are more geographically disperse are characterized by reduced
financial market transparency and a higher cost of capital. In terms of economic magnitude, a
one standard deviation increase in the cross sectional average physical distance between a
firm’s headquarters and its investment property locations is associated with, on average, a 13
basis point (b.p.) increase in the firm’s weighted average cost of capital. Similarly, we find
consistent evidence that greater intrafirm cultural distances, regardless of which of our four
alternative indices are employed, are also associated with increased capital costs for sample
firms. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation cross sectional increase in
the relative cultural distance between a firm’s headquarters nation and its investment property
locations is associated with, on average, a 67 b.p. increase in the firm’s weighted average cost
of capital.32
Turning to our control variables, a number of these attributes exhibit strong relations which are
generally in line with ex-ante expectations and/or previous findings in the empirical literature.
Highlighting a few of the more noteworthy results, consistent with emerging evidence offered
by Cashman et al. (2016), political risk appears to play an important role within Asia-Pacific
property markets, with three of our four risk proxies exhibiting high levels of statistical
significance across all model specifications in Table 5.33 Similarly, consistent with previous real
estate findings, but somewhat at odds with the broader finance literature, capital costs across
this region appear to benefit from the reduced uncertainty associated with legal systems
grounded on the foundational tenets of rules based civil law as opposed to UK based common
law. As argued by Cashman et al. (2015), the contractual surety offered by civil law based
legal systems may reduce the risk and uncertainty associated with exposure to unfamiliar (and
unwritten) customs, practices, and precedents which govern common law. Continuing, we also
find firms with more assets, and those with more tangible assets, exhibit lower costs of capital,
as do firms with more secured debt and/or rated debt outstanding. Consistent with increased
complexity leading to increased opacity, we also observe that firms entering new countries,
and those whose shares are traded on an exchange in a country other than where they are
headquartered, are both characterized by higher weighted average costs of capital. Moreover,
we observe that firms with investment property holdings focused exclusively within their home
country enjoy lower capital costs, while capital costs are directly related to the number of
countries in which a firm holds investment property interests. Finally, we note that firms with
more foreign investment experience have lower costs of capital. These latter results are again
consistent with the notion that increasing cultural diversity increases information opacity,
thereby raising a firm’s cost of capital acquisition. However, we also note that firms with foreign
denominated debt outstanding evidence a lower cost of capital. While this appears somewhat
in contrast to our core opacity results, it is potentially explained by: 1) firms raising debt
internationally when it offers an opportunity to lower their cost of capital, and/or 2) firms
matching the location and/or currency of their capital raising activities with that of their
investing and revenue/income generation.
Potentially, intrafirm physical distance will have a larger impact when the firm’s headquarters
and properties are located in different countries than when they are located in the same
country. For example, the physical distance between a firm headquartered in Singapore with
investment properties in Malaysia may have a stronger impact on its cost of capital than the
physical distance between a firm headquartered in Melbourne with properties in Perth, despite

the latter having a larger intrafirm physical distance. In untabulated analyses we explore this
possibility by interacting our home country indicator variable with intrafirm physical distance. In
doing so, we find that intrafirm physical distance matters regardless of whether the firm invests
in multiple countries or limits itself to a single country. More specifically, the larger the intrafirm
physical distance, the higher the firm’s WACC. Moreover, this relation is actually magnified
among firms investing only in their home country, potentially suggesting that while the costs
and difficulties of managing disperse operations are still borne by the firm, far flung domestic
operations do not engender the same level of geographic, interjurisdictional, or regulatory
diversification benefits as cross-border investing.
While WACC represents a firm’s overall financing costs, the interactions between the various
intrafirm physical and cultural distance metrics and the costs of their individual financing
components may also be informative. We explore these relations in Table 6. Consistent with
our previously reported findings, the results presented in Panel A of Table 6 indicate that a
firm’s cost of equity financing is directly related to cultural distance across all model
specifications. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s
average cultural distance between its headquarters and investment property locations is
associated with, on average, a 122 b.p. increase in equity capital costs. Interestingly, however,
we observe that intrafirm physical distance is only significantly related to a firm’s cost of equity
in one of the four model specifications examined. These results potentially suggest cultural
distance may have a more direct impact on a firm’s cost of equity than intrafirm physical
distance. Additionally, we note that risk premiums associated with the various stock exchange
trading venues across the countries in which sample firm investment properties are located
may influence a firm’s cost of capital. In untabulated analysis, we explore this possibility by
replacing each firm’s political risk exposure proxies with a weighted average of the stock
market risk premiums to which they are exposed.34 Comfortingly, we observe qualitatively
similar results to those previously reported when we use these weighted average stock market
risk premiums. Namely, both physical and cultural distance are significantly related to a firm’s
cost of equity and WACC.
Table 6 The effects of distance on the component costs of capital acquisition
Panel A: Determinants of a-p real estate firm’s cost of equity (re)
Variables
(I)
(II)
Geographic distance
0.001
−0.001
Physical distance
(0.32)
(−0.16)
Cultural distance indices
0.038***
Hofstede 4 Factor index
(5.79)
0.056***
Hofstede 6 Factor index
(6.09)
GLOBE 4 Factor index

(III)

(IV)

−0.002
(−0.61)

0.007*
(1.70)

0.058***

(9.27)

Yes
14,497
0.605

0.058***
(6.87)
Yes
14,497
0.604

(III)

(IV)

0.001
(1.30)

0.001
(1.26)

GLOBE 9 Factor index
Controls
Yes
Yes
Observations
14,497
14,497
Adjusted R-squared
0.604
0.604
Panel B: Determinants of a-p real estate firm’s cost of debt (rd)
Variables
(I)
(II)
Geographic distance
0.001
0.001*
Physical distance
(1.22)
(1.80)
Cultural distance indices
−0.007***
Hofstede 4 Factor index
(−4.61)
−0.014***
Hofstede 6 Factor index
(−6.56)

0.002
(1.21)

GLOBE 4 Factor index
GLOBE 9 Factor index
Year & month fixed effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes
14,497
0.606

Yes
14,497
0.607

Yes
14,497
0.606

−0.000
(−0.04)
Yes
14,497
0.605

This table examines the effects of distance on a firm’s component costs of capital. Panel A reports the
results regarding the firm’s cost of equity (re), while Panel B reports the results related to the firm’s cost
of debt (rd). All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and are clustered by firm and yearmonth. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively

In Panel B, we examine a firm’s cost of debt financing. Exploring these results, we find little
support for the notion that increasing intrafirm physical or cultural distance increases a firm’s
cost of debt. While interesting, these results are not entirely unexpected. More specifically,
both Cashman et al. (2015, 2016) report real estate firms investing internationally generally
exhibit lower leverage.35 Their findings suggest that instead of raising the price of borrowing,
lenders may ration the amount of capital extended to these firms. Consistent with the notion of
potential capital rationing, in untabulated results we find that more geographically and/or
culturally disperse firms do indeed exhibit lower leverage ratios.36
We next ensure the robustness of our findings by splitting the sample between firms with
active property development programs and/or pipelines versus firms focusing exclusively on
the operation and/or management of existing facilities.37 We then examine whether the
observed relation between a firm’s weighted average cost of capital and its intrafirm physical

and cultural distance measures hold in these more focused sub-samples. Splitting the sample
along this dimension is motivated by two key factors. First, the requisite skills necessary to
understand the risk exposure and management capabilities of a firm may vary markedly with
the nature of their holdings. To the extent assets in place, versus those under (various stages
of) development, are more informationally transparent, both capital costs and the importance
of intrafirm distance could vary meaningfully along this dimension. Second, we are unable to
fully identify the scope, importance, and location of all currently on-going development projects
undertaken by property developers. For example, many announced projects in the early
planning stages will never actually be constructed, or may be sold to other organizations
before completion. Similarly the geographic exposure of active property developers is likely
more fluid and dynamic than that faced by owner-operators, as emerging market opportunities
may lead these firms to quickly enter new markets (or leave existing ones) seeking to
capitalize on previously unforeseen opportunities. These factors would serve to induce noise
into our measure of intrafirm distance and geopolitical risk exposure, thereby making it harder
for us to detect a significant relation. This bias should be most pronounced among firms with
active development programs. The results of this robustness analysis are presented in Table
7, and are once again broadly consistent with our previous empirical findings. Namely, intrafirm
physical and cultural distance are positively related to a firm’s weighted average cost of capital.
More specifically, the results presented in Panel A of Table 7 (development firm sub-sample)
are consistent with on-going development properties mitigating our ability to detect precise
relations. We find no evidence of a relation between a firm’s physical footprint and its WACC,
though intrafirm cultural distance remains significantly positively related to WACC. In Panel B,
the non-development sub-sample, we again find strong evidence supporting our hypothesized
focal relation, as a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is once again significantly related to
both its intrafirm physical and cultural distance. Taken together, these results suggest that the
relation between cultural distance and a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is prevalent
across both firm types, while physical distance is related to WACC for non-development firms.
Table 7 Development versus non-development activities
Panel A:
Variables
Geographic distance
Physical distance

(I)

(II)

(III)

(IV)

0.001
(0.21)

−0.000
(−0.04)

−0.001
(−0.42)

0.002
(0.64)

Cultural distance indices
Hofstede 4 Factor index
Hofstede 6 Factor index
GLOBE 4 Factor index

0.012***
(2.72)
0.024***
(3.33)
0.019***
(3.88)

Yes
8465
0.648

Yes
8465
0.648

Yes
8465
0.648

0.047***
(7.25)
Yes
8465
0.649

(I)

(II)

(III)

(IV)

0.012***
(2.65)

0.011**
(2.37)

0.006
(1.36)

0.020***
(4.30)

GLOBE 9 Factor index
Controls
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Panel B:
Variables
Geographic distance
Physical distance
Cultural distance indices
Hofstede 4 Factor index

0.032***
(4.39)
0.044***
(4.56)

Hofstede 6 Factor index

0.067***
(8.32)

GLOBE 4 Factor index
GLOBE 9 Factor index
Year & month fixed effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes
6032
0.578

Yes
6032
0.578

Yes
6032
0.582

0.057***
(5.37)
Yes
6032
0.579

This table examines the robustness of our focal relations by split the sample. Panel A reports the
results regarding firm’s with an active development program, while Panel B reports the results for nondevelopment firms. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and are clustered by firm and
year-month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively

In addition to ensuring our results hold across firm development activities, we also examine
how the relation between a firm’s cost of capital and its intrafirm physical and cultural distance
changes through time. As mentioned above, Adams et al. (2015) find risk spillovers across
geographically proximate real estate firms are most pronounced during periods of economic
stress and uncertainty. Consistent with this framework, both Kim (2009); Newell and Peng
(2009) suggest the global financial crisis may well have materially influenced the performance,
operations, and structural linkages of Asia-Pacific real estate markets both with, and in
comparison to, their global counterparts. As such, we view year-end 2007 as representing a
potentially important structural break point within our analysis. Ex-ante, we anticipate that both
during, and immediately following this crisis period, market participants may well have become
increasingly risk-averse and more wary of taking on informationally opaque risk exposures. To
explore this possibility, we create a post financial crisis indicator variable, which we then
interact with both our physical and cultural distance measures. Positive coefficient estimates

on our interaction terms would be consistent with increased levels of risk aversion in the postcrisis period.
The results of this robustness analysis are presented in Table 8. Examining the results, we
again find a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is related to both its intrafirm physical and
cultural distance, and furthermore, the increase in a firm’s weighted average cost of capital
associated with increased physical and/or cultural distance is more pronounced following the
global financial crisis. Specifically, we find that the interaction terms between physical distance
and our financial crisis indicator variable are significantly positive in two of our four model
specifications. The average magnitude of these coefficients on the interaction terms
corresponds to a 17.5% increase in risk sensitivity during the post-crisis period. Additionally,
the interactions between our cultural distance measures and the financial crisis indicator are
positive and significant across all four model specifications. These interaction term coefficients
represent, on average, a 26% increase in risk sensitivity during the post-crisis era. Taken
together, these findings suggest that physical and cultural distance may well play an
increasingly important role in determining a firm’s cost of capital following the global financial
crisis.38
Table 8 Effects of the financial crisis
Variables

(I)

(II)

(III)

(IV)

0.004
(1.64)
0.000
(0.76)

0.010***
(3.94)
0.001
(0.90)

Geographic distance
Physical distance
Physical distance * Post financial crisis

0.005**
(2.08)
0.002***
(3.02)

0.005**
(1.97)
0.001*
(1.75)

Cultural distance indices
Hofstede 4 Factor index
Hofstede 4 Factor index * Post financial crisis
Hofstede 6 Factor index
Hofstede 6 Factor index * Post financial crisis
GLOBE 4 Factor index
GLOBE 4 Factor index * Post financial crisis
GLOBE 9 Factor index

0.016***
(3.44)
0.004**
(2.34)
0.021***
(3.29)
0.007***
(3.82)
0.034***
(8.76)
0.007***
(10.01)
0.030***

Variables

(I)

(II)

(III)

GLOBE 9 Factor index * Post financial crisis
Post financial crisis
Controls
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

0.028*
(1.75)
Yes
14,497
0.561

0.029*
(1.81)
Yes
14,497
0.561

0.006
(0.45)
Yes
14,497
0.566

(IV)
(5.94)
0.007***
(10.17)
−0.053***
(−3.00)
Yes
14,497
0.564

This table examines the effects of distance on an Asia-Pacific real estate firm’s cost of capital both
before and after the global financial crisis of 2007. The dependent variable is the implied weighted
average cost of capital acquisition. Post Financial Crisis is an indicator variable which assumes the
value of one for all firm-month observations after 2007, and zero otherwise. While we again include all
control variables previously employed in Table 5, for brevity their coefficient estimates are not reported.
Appendix 3 provides a detailed description of each variable examined. All standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity, and are clustered by both firm and year-month. ***, **, and * indicates statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively

Summary and Conclusions
Throughout this paper, we examine the impact of intrafirm physical and cultural distance on the
informational transparency of publicly traded firms. Specifically, using a sample of Asia-Pacific
real estate companies, we explore how a firm’s decision to invest in geographically and
culturally distant assets influences its implied cost of capital. Focusing our sample in this way
offers several important advantages. Notably, given the tangible nature of the revenue
generating assets held by real estate firms, as well as the scale and irreversible nature of
many commercial real estate projects, the selection of this industry allows us to readily and
accurately identify the geographic footprint of each sample firm. This identification is
strengthened by the highly localized nature of commercial real estate space markets, which in
turn is driven by the property type and location specificity (i.e., immovable nature) of the
underlying assets. Furthermore, firms within this industry are typically characterized by
relatively little investment in research and development activities, intellectual property rights, or
other intangible assets, once again allowing for a relatively clean assessment of the firm’s
underlying asset base. Potentially more important from a managerial perspective, firms across
this industry also tend to exhibit high, often regulatory mandated, payout ratios. As a result,
these firms face limitations on their ability to internally finance growth and expansion activities,
thereby making them both frequent issuers in the capital markets and uniquely concerned with
the potential impact of informational opacity on capital acquisition costs. Finally, from an
estimation perspective, the selection of the Asia-Pacific region as the geographic setting for
our analysis allows us to capture significant variation in our key focal parameters, as publicly
traded real estate firms across this region evidence a unique proclivity toward cross-border
investment activities. Taken together, these attributes allow us to more effectively isolate and
measure the impacts of intrafirm geographic and cultural distance on firm transparency within

this market sector. While we limit our analysis/sample to this single industry, we see no reason
the relations observed here would not be generalizable to a broader cross-section of firms.
Reviewing our focal results, we find strong evidence that Asia-Pacific real estate firms which
invest in assets that are more distant, either geographically or culturally, are perceived as more
informationally opaque by the marketplace. Specifically, these firms are characterized by
significantly higher implied costs of capital. These results suggest that increasing the distance
between a firm’s headquarters location and the revenue generating assets they own and/or
operate effectively serves to create non-trivial information barriers which make the firm harder
to value. Our geographic distance results are consistent with and extend the existing literature
which documents “locals” possess an informational advantage compared to more distant
investors, while our cultural distance results are also generally consistent with the growing
literature documenting the importance of culture to the marketplace and the difficulties that
arise when firms attempt to span multiple cultures. More specifically, using four alternative
proxies for a firm’s intrafirm cultural distance, we find cross-border investment activities are
easier to value when the investment property is located in a nation whose cultural
underpinnings are similar to those of the nation in which the firm is headquartered. Robustness
tests reveal these relations hold for subsamples of both development and non-development
oriented firms, while additionally suggesting our findings are more pronounced during the post
global financial crisis era. Together, these findings strongly suggest both intrafirm geographic
and cultural distance represent value relevant components of a firm’s information environment,
and as such, should be strategically managed to enhance shareholder utility.

Footnotes
1. For example, Jiang et al. (2014) find that firms with better corporate governance are
viewed as being less ambiguous and exhibit lower bid-ask spreads.
2. These influences include, but are not limited to, factors such as language, religion,
gender roles, and a variety of additional customs and ideologies specific to a group of
people.
3. Examples include, but are not limited to: Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010); Anderson et al.
(2011); Aggarwal et al. (2012); Baltzer et al. (2013); Beracha et al. (2014); Nahata et al.
(2014).
4. Noteworthy studies of these issues include, but are not limited to, Grubel (1968); Levy
and Sarnat (1970); Stulz (1981a, b); Grauer and Hakansson (1987); French and
Poterba (1991); Eichholtz (1996).
5. Similarly, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find: 1) retail investors exhibit a proclivity
toward overinvesting in local firms, and 2) retail investors earn superior returns on their
investments in such local firms.
6. Additional evidence on the information advantage of local investors within the
commercial and investment banking arenas may be found in Degryse and Ongena
(2005); Butler (2008); Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), while market microstructure based
evidence on the informational advantage of local traders is offered by Hau (2001);
Schultz (2003); Kedia and Zhou (2011) among others.

7. An alternative explanation, suggested by Gaspar and Massa (2007), is that local
investors are better positioned to monitor firms. Diamond (1984), among others,
provides insight into agency issues associated with monitoring firm performance.
8. North (1990) argues such social customs and conventions may well have a larger
impact on daily interactions than more traditionally recognized measures of political risk
such as a country’s foundational legal system. Similarly, Williamson (2000)
demonstrates how cultural forces provide the underpinnings of the formal rules of
economic activity.
9. For examples see: Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010); Anderson et al. (2011).
10. We note that an alternative means to examine these relations would be to examine the
impact of distance on bid-ask spreads, analyst forecast dispersion/errors, the probability
of split bond ratings, or various other proxies for increased informational opacity
regarding the firm. We have explored the relations between bid-ask spreads and our
distance measures, and once again find qualitatively similar results to those reported in
the current paper. In sum, both increased physical and cultural distance are associated
with wider (percentage) bid-ask spreads. Due to space constraints, as well as previous
reviewer/discussant feedback suggesting the conceptual link between our focal distance
relations is likely more important to company operations and insiders than market-wide
investors, within the context of the current investigation we choose to focus our analysis
exclusively on our cost of capital based results.
11. While conventional wisdom posits that REITs and listed property trusts hold relatively
recognizable and easy to value assets, we note this may not always be the case for
individual firms. In particular, while the physical structures held by an organization are
generally a matter of public record, individual tenant lease terms are generally not
publicly disclosed. To the extent an individual property’s value is derived from property
specific lease terms, we may well be understating the valuation complexities inherent
within this industry.
12. As a point of comparison, consider car manufacturer Toyota. While the bulk of Toyota’s
Japanese operations are located in and around Toyota City, the profitability of the
company is not critically dependent upon the economic vitality of the local economy, but
rather upon the broader economic conditions over the (national, regional, or even
international) range of markets where their products are ultimately distributed and sold.
Commercial real estate markets, on the other hand, remain highly localized. As
buildings are typically designed with a specific purpose in mind, and in addition are
difficult if not impossible to move, both type and location specificity issues lead
commercial real estate rents to be highly localized. As such, cash flows accruing to
individual real estate investment properties are driven primarily by local economic
conditions.
13. While this coverage includes only a slight majority (127 / 211 = 60.2%) of the publicly
traded REITs across the region as identified by European Public Real Estate
Association (EPRA) (2013), these firms account for over 90% of the sector’s total
market capitalization. Additionally, we note the sample includes (at a minimum) the five
largest REITs headquartered in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore. Precise
property company and developer coverage rates are much harder to assess, but given
the resulting size and characteristics of our sample firms, they again appear non-trivial.
That said, our cost of capital estimates require multiple years of data to impute, thereby

leading to the selection of a sample which is likely to be disproportionately weighted
toward older, more established firms. To the extent these firms are more likely to
evaluate the costs and opportunities associated with international investments, we view
our results as a conservative estimate of the impact of intrafirm distance, and urge
caution in generalizing these results to both newer and smaller firms.
14. We determine a firm’s total debt by averaging the firm’s fiscal year-end total debt
numbers across the current and immediately preceding years.
15. For a detailed discussion of the development of the residual income valuation model,
see Feltham and Ohlson (1995); Lee et al. (1999); Gebhardt et al. (2001). For examples
of this model being applied to real estate markets, see Danielsen et al. (2014);
Cashman et al. (2015).
16. Ideally, a firm’s average geographic distance exposure would be weighted to reflect the
relative values of each investment property holding. Unfortunately, our data do not
include detailed, reliable, and timely information on individual property values, and thus,
do not allow for this level of refinement. As such, our geographic distance metrics, as
well as our cultural distance metrics outlined below, weight each investment property
holding equally, regardless of their size, property type, or perceived value.
17. Hofstede index values are unavailable for 10 countries in which sample firms hold a
total of 46 investment property interests. Thus, index values are imputed for 0.47% of
our sample properties. Excluding these properties from the analysis has no material
effect on our conclusions.
18. GLOBE dimension scores are unavailable for 15 countries in which sample firms hold a
total of 72 investment property interests. Thus, dimension scores are imputed for 0.73%
of our sample properties. Excluding these properties from the analysis has no material
effect on our conclusions.
19. As previously mentioned with respect to geographic distances, while we would like to
calculate country weights based on market values, we are not able to obtain estimates
of the market value of each firm’s investments in separate countries. Therefore, we are
once again forced to calculate weights based upon the number of properties in each
firm’s investment portfolio.
20. For example, following Cashman et al. (2015) we control for the percentage of a firm’s
investment properties that are located in countries with legal systems based on British
Common Law. Additionally, to minimize the effect of outliers on our dataset, both the
market-to-book and leverage ratios for sample firms are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. Finally, a number of the firm characteristics reported by SNL are only provided
annually or quarterly. Operationally, these variables are matched to the months covered
by the report. We note that temporal aggregation does not appear to be driving our
findings, as we observe qualitatively similar results if we perform our analyses annually
(to match the most course data in our sample) rather than monthly.
21. We readily cede the point that a plethora of alternative political risk proxies are
potentially viable. As such, the selection of any specific risk metric is inherently
somewhat arbitrary. The four measures we have selected have each been used in
recent, peer-reviewed publications, and more importantly were selected as they exhibit
relatively little correlation with one another. More specifically, the average Pearson
correlation coefficient across these four alternative risk metrics averages less than 0.20
in absolute value, with only the pairwise correlation between our Disclosure and

Operations Risk Indices exhibiting a correlation coefficient greater than 0.22 in absolute
value.
22. It is also quite possible that firms headquartered and listed in separate countries have
strategically done so to enhance their access to affordable capital sources within the
marketplace. Thus, in the absence of appropriate additional controls, the observed
relation could easily be reversed. Given our use of both country fixed effects and
additional capital market controls, ex-ante we expected the increased complexity effects
to dominate within the context of our empirical results.
23. We have included 37 control variables that are categorized into four groups: political risk
measures, business environment measures, firm characteristic measures, and foreign
experience measures. A list, and detailed definitions, of these variables are provided in
Appendix 3.
24. We note that we receive qualitatively similar results when we winsorize the sample at
1%–99%, or 5%–95%.
25. Note, in recent years the firm has dramatically reduced the scope of its geographic
exposure, currently holding assets exclusively in Australia and New Zealand.
26. Additionally, we note that while a firm’s intrafirm physical and cultural distance
measures are statistically significantly related to its political risk exposure, the
correlations are relatively low.
27. As Cashman et al. (2015) find evidence that firms located in nations with legal systems
based on Common Law traditions have higher capital acquisition costs, we include an
indicator variable identifying those firms subject to legal systems based upon the tenets
of British (UK) common law. Similarly, to accounting for potential variation in the
transparency of a firm’s financial disclosures, we control for the accounting convention
(GAAP vs. IFRS) employed by sample firms.
28. High regulatory mandated payout requirements for real estate firms electing REIT status
serve to effectively drive MTB ratios toward 1.0 for firms within this industry. Examples
of studies finding real estate company debt ratios in the 40–50% range include Feng et
al. (2007); Boudry et al. (2010); Harrison et al. (2011); Cashman et al. (2016).
29. In untabulated results we also explore the univariate relations for both the cost of equity
and cost of debt separately. We find that our results are stronger when we examine the
cost of equity, however our results with respect to the cost of debt are not consistent
with our hypothesized relation. One potential explanation for these somewhat conflicting
results is offered by Cashman et al. (2015) who suggest real estate lenders may
account for prospective borrower risk through either the pricing mechanism or credit
rationing. Alternatively stated, rather than charging a higher interest rate, lenders may
simply reduce their willingness to lend.
30. On average, multinational firms within our sample exhibit an average market
capitalization of $4.6 million, while their single country counterparts exhibit an average
market capitalization of only $2 million.
31. Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we replace the exchange fixed effects with
country fixed effects.
32. Marginal effects based upon changes in Hofstede index values average 36 b.p., while
marginal effects based upon GLOBE index values are substantively larger at an
average of 98 b.p. Untabulated tests examining our intrafirm physical and cultural
distance metrics in isolation provides qualitatively similar results. This suggests the

unexpected Table 4 univariate results with respect to physical distance are likely the byproduct of complex relations with omitted firm characteristics, rather than a high degree
of correlation between our physical and cultural distance metrics.
33. Interestingly, however, we note our observed relation between a firm’s Operations Risk
Index (ORI) and their implied cost of capital is negative, a result in direct contrast with
ex-ante expectations.
34. Stock market risk premiums are calculated in the same manner as our political risk
metrics. Specifically, we calculate each firm’s property weighted average stock market
risk premium. Similarly, consistent with Armstrong et al. (2011), in untabulated results
sorting upon various dimensions of market competitiveness levels, we consistently find
evidence that both intrafirm physical and cultural distance materially influence a firm’s
capital acquisition costs.
35. In untabulated analysis, we observe a similar pattern in our sample.
36. An alternative explanation for the insignificant cost of debt distance relations is that
firms may have greater access to foreign debt markets in which their investment
properties are located. Distance may be irrelevant for firms borrowing money abroad, as
the investment properties (and cash flows) securing these loans may well be ‘local’ from
the perspective of these foreign lenders. In untabulated tests, we explore this possibility
by limiting the sample exclusively to firms with foreign denominated debt outstanding.
We observe qualitatively similar results within this more restrictive sub-sample.
37. In untabulated tests we also bi-furcate the sample between high and low growth option
(MtoB) firms, and also across REIT versus non-REIT organizations. Given the prevailing
regulatory environments across the Asia-Pacific real estate landscape, the development
versus non-development sample split is very similar to the REIT versus non-REIT
bifurcation. In these additional tests, we continue to find support for our focal hypothesis
that a firm’s weighted average cost of capital is related to both its intrafirm physical and
cultural distance.
38. In untabulated results, where we exclude observations occurring in both 2007 and 2008
from the sample due to the large fluctuations associated with the global financial crisis,
we find qualitatively similar results.

Acknowledgements
We thank Jack Cooney, Jonathan Dombrow, Gangzhi Fan, Paul Goebel, Joe Halford, Scott
Hsu, Mark Moore, Seow Eng Ong, and seminar participants at Baylor University, Colorado
State University, and the 2016 Asia Pacific Real Estate Research Symposium at Konkuk
University for their helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are, as always, the
sole responsibility of the authors.

Appendix 1
Table 9 Geographic location of properties held by sample firms
Property country
Australia
Belgiuma

# of Properties
1941
5

% of Total properties
19.65%
0.05%

Property country
Brazil
Burmab
Cambodiab
Canada
China
Czech Republica
Fijib
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Macaub
Malaysia
Maldivesb
Mexico
Mongoliab
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Philippines
Poland
Russia
Seychellesb
Singapore
Slovakiaa
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lankab
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan

# of Properties
1
4
2
11
1503
3
5
55
45
1161
1
162
62
1
1
2573
9
126
14
2
1
1
4
82
23
7
1
3
799
1
1
11
3
3
1
1
5

% of Total properties
0.01%
0.04%
0.02%
0.11%
15.22%
0.03%
0.05%
0.56%
0.46%
11.76%
0.01%
1.64%
0.63%
0.01%
0.01%
26.05%
0.09%
1.28%
0.14%
0.02%
0.01%
0.01%
0.04%
0.83%
0.23%
0.07%
0.01%
0.03%
8.09%
0.01%
0.01%
0.11%
0.03%
0.03%
0.01%
0.01%
0.05%

Property country
# of Properties
% of Total properties
a
Tanzania
1
0.01%
Thailand
46
0.47%
Turkey
1
0.01%
USA
922
9.34%
b
United Arab Emirates
4
0.04%
United Kingdom
231
2.34%
b
Vanuatu
1
0.01%
Vietnama
36
0.36%
Total:
9876
100%
aIndicates countries with missing Globe Scores. For countries with missing scores, we replace
them with the cross sectional average of the corresponding index for the given month
bIndicates countries with missing Hofstede and Globe Scores. For countries with missing
scores, we replace them with the cross sectional average of the corresponding index for the
given month

Appendix 2
Table 10 Sample firms by headquarters country
Australia (23)
Abacus Property Group
Arena REIT
Aspen Group
Astro Japan Property Trust
Aveo Group Limited
BWP Trust
Carindale Property Trust
CFS Retail Property Trust
Charter Hall Group
Charter Hall Retail Real Estate Investment Trust
Cromwell Property Group
DEXUS Property Group
Federation Centres
Goodman Group
GPT Group
Growthpoint Properties Australia
Ingenia Communities Group
Investa Office Fund

Lend Lease Corporation Limited
Mirvac Group
Peet Limited
Stockland
Sunland Group Limited
China (7)
Agile Property Holdings Limited
Evergrande Real Estate Group Limited
Guangzhou R&F Properties Company Limited
KWG Property Holding Limited
Modern Land (China) Co., Limited
Shui On Land Limited
SOHO China Limited
Hong Kong (48)
Asia Standard International Group Limited
Century City International Holdings Limited
Champion Real Estate Investment Trust
Cheung Kong Holdings Limited
China Overseas Land & Investment Limited
China Resources Land Limited
Chinese Estates Holdings Limited
COFCO Land Holdings Limited
Country Garden Holdings Company Limited
Far East Consortium International Limited
Glorious Property Holdings Limited
Great Eagle Holdings Limited
Hang Lung Group Limited
Hang Lung Properties Limited
Harbour Centre Development Limited
Henderson Land Development Company Limited
HKR International Limited
Hon Kwok Land Investment Company, Limited
Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels, Limited
Hongkong Land Holdings Limited
Hopewell Holdings Limited
Hopson Development Holdings Limited
Hui Xian Real Estate Investment Trust
Hysan Development Company Limited

Kerry Properties Limited
Kowloon Development Company Limited
Lifestyle Properties Development Limited
Link Real Estate Investment Trust
Mandarin Oriental International Limited
MTR Corporation Limited
New World China Land Limited
New World Development Company Limited
Pacific Century Premium Developments Limited
Paliburg Holdings Limited
Prosperity Real Estate Investment Trust
Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited
Regal Real Estate Investment Trust
Shangri-La Asia Limited
Shenzhen Investment Limited
Shimao Property Holdings Limited
Sino Land Company Limited
SRE Group Limited
Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited
Sunlight Real Estate Investment Trust
Swire Pacific Limited
Swire Properties Limited
Wharf (Holdings) Limited
Yuexiu Real Estate Investment Trust
India (8)
Asian Hotels (North) Limited
DB Realty Limited
Lancor Holdings Limited
Mahindra Lifespace Developers Limited
Oriental Hotels Limited
Parsvnath Developers Limited
Peninsula Land Limited
Royal Orchid Hotels Limited
Japan (27)
Advance Residence Investment Corporation
AEON Mall Co., Ltd.
Daibiru Corporation
Fukuoka REIT Corporation

GLP J-REIT
Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd.
Heiwa Real Estate REIT, Inc.
Hulic Co., Ltd
Ichigo Real Estate Investment Corporation
Invincible Investment Corporation
Japan Excellent, Inc.
Japan Hotel REIT Investment Corporation
Japan Logistics Fund, Inc.
Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation
Japan Rental Housing Investments Inc.
Japan Retail Fund Investment Corporation
Kenedix Residential Investment Corporation
MID REIT, Inc.
Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Fudosan Company Limited
Mori Hills REIT Investment Corporation
NTT Urban Development Corporation
ORIX JREIT Inc.
Premier Investment Corporation
Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd.
Tokyu REIT, Inc.
United Urban Investment Corporation
Singapore (47)
AIMS AMP Capital Industrial REIT
Amara Holdings Limited
Ascendas Hospitality Trust
Ascendas India Trust
Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust
Ascott Residence Trust
Banyan Tree Holdings Limited
Cache Logistics Trust
Cambridge Industrial Trust
CapitaCommercial Trust
CapitaLand Limited
CapitaMall Trust
CapitaRetail China Trust
CDL Hospitality Trusts

City Developments Limited
Far East Hospitality Trust
First Real Estate Investment Trust
Forterra Trust
Fortune REIT
Frasers Centrepoint Trust
Frasers Commercial Trust
Global Logistic Properties Limited
GuocoLand Limited
GuocoLeisure Limited
Ho Bee Land Limited
Hotel Properties Limited
Keppel Land Limited
Keppel REIT
Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust
Mapletree Commercial Trust
Mapletree Industrial Trust
Mapletree Logistics Trust
OUE Hospitality Trust
OUE Limited
Parkway Life REIT
Religare Health Trust
Sabana Shari’ah Compliant Industrial REIT
Saizen Real Estate Investment Trust
Soilbuild Business Space REIT
Stamford Land Corporation Limited
Starhill Global Real Estate Investment Trust
Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust
United Industrial Corporation Limited
UOL Group Limited
Wheelock Properties (Singapore) Limited
Wing Tai Holdings Limited
Yanlord Land Group Limited

Appendix 3
Table 11 Variable definitions
Cost of Capital Metrics
Weighted
The firm’s weighted average cost of capital, where debt and equity
average Cost of
weights are based upon each firm’s market leverage ratio.
capital
Cost of debt
The firm’s cost of debt, estimated as total interest expense divided by
average total debt.
Cost of equity
The firm’s cost of equity capital, estimated using the residual income
model of valuation.
Geographic and Cultural Distance Metrics
Physical distance The average geographic distance between each firm’s headquarters and
its investment property locations, measured in thousands of miles.
Hofstede 4 Factor The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using four
index
of Hofstede’s culture dimensions: Power Distance, Individualism versus
Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, and Uncertainty Avoidance.
Hofstede 6 Factor The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using all of
index
Hofstede’s six culture dimensions.
GLOBE 4 Factor The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using four
index
of Globe’s culture dimensions: Future Orientation, Assertiveness, InGroup Collectivism, and Uncertainty Avoidance.
GLOBE 9 Factor The property weighted average of the firm’s cultural distance using all
index
nine of Globe’s culture dimensions.
Political Risk Metrics
Disclosure
The property weighted average of the Business Extent of Disclosure
index, as reported by the World Bank. Higher values indicate investors
are less protected, as firms are required to disclose less financial and
ownership information.
ORI
The property weighted average of the operations risk index, as reported
by Business Risk Services. Higher values indicate more operational risk.
R-Factor
The property weighted average of the Business Risk Service remittances
and repatriation of capital factor. Higher values indicate it is relatively
harder to repatriate profits.
PRI
The property weighted average of the Political Risk Index, as reported by
Business Risk Service. It is an assessment of a panel of 102 experts who
pinpoint areas of pivotal political change, and provides ratings on
sociopolitical conditions. Higher values indicate more sociopolitical risk.
Business Environment Measures
UK Law
The property weighted average of the percentage of a real estate
company’s properties located in countries with a (United Kingdom)
Common Law based legal system.

Bank dominated An indicator variable taking the value of one if the ratio of domestic
assets of deposit money banks to total equity market capitalization is less
than 1.10, zero otherwise.
GAAP
An indicator variable which equals one if the firm uses GAAP accounting
principles for its corporate financial disclosures, and zero otherwise.
Time to export
The property weighted average of the minimum time it takes (in days) to
export products from a country, as reported by the World Bank.
Property
The property weighted average of the minimum number of procedures
acquisition
required for a business to secure rights to a property, as reported by the
complexity
World Bank.
Market cap / GDP The property weighted average of the ratio of the equity market
capitalization of domestic firms to a country’s GDP, as reported by the
World Bank.
Broadband per
The property weighted average of the number of broadband subscribers
100
per 100 people, as reported by the World Bank.
Education
The property weighted average of the percentage of GDP spent per
spending
student on primary school education, as reported by the World Bank.
Female labor
The property weighted average of the proportion of females who actively
Force Participation participate in the work force, as reported by the World Bank.
General Firm Characteristics
Ln(Mkt Cap)
Equals the log transformation of the firm’s total equity market
capitalization (in millions of dollars) as reported by Bloomberg.
MtoB
The market value to book value of equity ratio, as reported by
Bloomberg.
Leverage
The ratio of a firm’s total debt (short-term plus long-term debt) divided by
its total common equity, as reported by Bloomberg.
Asset tangibility Total Real Estate Operations / Total Assets.
Total assets (in The firm’s total assets measured in US dollars.
$1000s)
Profitability
Funds from Operations (FFO) divided by Total Assets.
Secured debt
Secured Debt divided by Total Debt.
Rated debt
An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has rated debt
outstanding, and zero otherwise.
Split rating
An indicator variable set equal to one if two or more rating agencies have
different notch level long-term issuer credit ratings for the firm, and zero
otherwise.
Asset age
Lengh of time (in years) since the first record of the firm’s total assets in
SNL.
Repurchases
An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm’s total shares
outstanding declines by more than 2% over a given year, and zero
otherwise.

The change in a firm’s funds from operations (∆FFO) divided by its
change in total revenue (∆Revenue). To reduce the effect of extreme
value observations along this dimension, sample observations are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Lease payments The firm’s total committed capital lease obligations divided by its Total
Assets.
# of Countries
The total number of different countries in which the firm owns investment
properties during a given month.
Development
An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm engages in investment
property development, construction programs, or has an active property
development pipeline; zero otherwise
REIT status
An indicator variable for whether a company has elected to be taxed as a
real estate investment trust (REIT) for corporate income tax purposes. It
equals one if the company has elected REIT status, and zero otherwise.
# of properties
The total number of investment properties owned by a firm.
Single country
An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is invested in only one
country, and zero otherwise.
Home indicator An indicator variable set equal to one if a firm owns no foreign properties,
and zero otherwise.
Foreign Experience
Entrance
An indicator variable for whether a firm buys a property in a given country
for the first time. If the property acquisition date is missing, we replace it
with the date for the first observation of that firm. It equals one if it is the
first time to buy a property in a given country, and zero otherwise.
Foreign tenure
The property weighted, average number of months for holding properties.
If the property acquisition date is missing, we replace it with the date for
the first observation of that firm.
Headquarter
An indicator variable set equal to one if a firm’s exchange trading venue
≠Exchange
is located in a different nation than where its headquarters is located.
Foreign
The ratio of a firm’s number of foreign properties owned to its total
properties/Total
number of properties.
properties
Foreign debt
An indicator variable set equal to one if a firm has outstanding debt
indicator
denominated in the currency of a foreign country, and zero otherwise.
Operating
leverage
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